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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 18-1699 
____________ 
 
LUDIMILLA RAMOS DA SILVA 
a/k/a Lulu Da Silva 
a/k/a Ludimilla Dasilva, 
 
      Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
                                                       Respondent 
      
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Nos. A208-332-187) 
Immigration Judge: John B. Carle 
                        
                                     
Argued on July 9, 2019 
Before:  MCKEE, ROTH and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  January 24, 2020) 
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Thomas M. Griffin  (Argued) 
Surin & Griffin 
718 Arch Street 
Suite 701N 
Philadelphia, PA 19106 
 
   Counsel for Petitioner 
 
Scott G. Stewart  (Argued) 
United States Department of Justice 
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20530 
 
Stefanie A. Svoren-Jay 
United States Department of Justice  
Office of Immigration Litigation 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
 
   Counsel for Respondent 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 Appellant Ludimilla Ramos Da Silva petitions for 
review of her final order of removal.  She contends that the 
Board of Immigration Appeals erred when it concluded that her 
convictions for assaulting her husband’s mistress were not 
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“connected to” the extreme cruelty she suffered, rendering her 
ineligible for cancellation of removal.  We agree.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will grant Da Silva’s petition for review 
and vacate the BIA’s removal order.  
 
I 
 Da Silva, a native of Brazil, was admitted to the United 
States in 1994 with a B-2 visa; she was then about two years 
old.  She overstayed her visa and has never left the United 
States.  Da Silva married a United States citizen, Aziim Leach, 
on April 30, 2012.  Leach, a member of the armed services, 
subjected Da Silva to emotional, psychological, and physical 
abuse throughout their marriage.  For instance, he refused to 
file immigration paperwork that would provide her with 
documented status and used her undocumented status as a 
method to control her.  Leach also hit Da Silva’s daughter and 
pushed Da Silva against a wall multiple times.1   
 
Most importantly to this appeal, Leach engaged in 
numerous extramarital affairs, including one particularly 
intense relationship with his coworker, L.N.  On September 1, 
2014, Da Silva discovered sexually explicit text messages 
                                                 
1 Da Silva has been subjected to abuse throughout her life.  She 
was raised by a single mother, who inflicted physical and 
emotional harm upon her children until she abandoned Da 
Silva and her siblings.  When she was fifteen, she was raped at 
a friend’s house.  She met and married her first husband at age 
eighteen and he, like Leach, was physically and emotionally 
abusive.  Following her first divorce, Da Silva began seeing a 
mental health counselor, who diagnosed her with post-
traumatic stress disorder.    
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between Leach and L.N.  Da Silva questioned Leach about the 
messages and called L.N. to arrange a meeting at L.N.’s house 
so they could talk.  When Da Silva arrived, L.N. got into Da 
Silva’s car, and Da Silva confronted L.N. with the text 
messages.  Da Silva claimed she feared that L.N. was about to 
hit her so she punched L.N. in the nose.   
 
Next, L.N. proposed that they go to Da Silva’s house, 
so they could talk with Leach.  When they arrived, L.N. and 
Leach claimed the affair was over.  Da Silva and L.N. then left 
to return to L.N.’s house but stopped at Da Silva’s friend’s 
house on the way, where there was a second confrontation 
regarding the affair.  Da Silva testified that L.N. said Leach 
was still her “daddy,” indicating that L.N. would continue the 
extramarital affair.2  In response, Da Silva “exploded” and, in 
“a blind rage,” struck L.N. in the nose again.3  The IJ 
recognized that Da Silva had “been provoked by a woman who 
was [having] an affair with her husband,” and the BIA noted 
her violent outburst was “an aberration.”4  Da Silva was 
arrested the following morning.  
 
On January 19, 2016, Da Silva pleaded guilty to two 
counts of assault in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(4) and was 
sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment.5  On July 31, 
2017, the government served Da Silva with a Notice to Appear, 
charging her with removability for overstaying her visa 
                                                 
2 A.R. 90, 190.  
3 A.R. 94, 495. 
4 A.R. 94, 4. 
5 Because the events at issue occurred at Fort Knox military 
base, a federal enclave in Kentucky, Da Silva was under federal 
jurisdiction.  
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pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B).  She sought cancellation 
of removal for battered spouses under the Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA),6 but was denied relief by both the 
Immigration Judge and the BIA.  
 
Petitioners are eligible for VAWA cancellation under 8 
U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A) if (1) they have been “battered or 
subjected to extreme cruelty” by a spouse who is a United 
States citizen, (2) they have been “physically present in the 
United States for a continuous period of not less than [three] 
years immediately preceding the date of such application,” (3) 
they have been “a person of good moral character” during the 
past three years, and (4) “the removal would result in extreme 
hardship to the alien, the alien’s child, or the alien’s parent.”7  
Da Silva concedes that she cannot satisfy the “good moral 
character” requirement because, as a result of  her assault 
conviction, she was “confined . . . to a penal institution for an 
aggregate period of one hundred and eighty days or more.”8  
However, she argues that she qualifies for the exception to the 
good moral character requirement, which provides that a 
petitioner is still eligible for VAWA cancellation if the “act or 
conviction was connected to the alien’s having been battered 
or subjected to extreme cruelty” and cancellation is otherwise 
warranted.9  
 
The IJ held that Da Silva’s assault convictions were not 
“connected to” her husband’s cruelty because she was not 
                                                 
6 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A). 
7 Id.   
8 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(7). 
9 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(C) (emphasis added).  
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“encouraged or induced” by him to commit the assault.10  
Rather, they were “connected to her having been provoked by 
a woman who was carrying on an affair with her husband” and 
were “a result of her anger toward her husband’s infidelity and 
anger toward the mistress’ behavior.”11  The IJ also concluded 
that she qualified for all other elements of VAWA cancellation.  
Specifically, the IJ found that Leach subjected her to extreme 
cruelty because he threatened to take away her children due to 
her undocumented status, was consistently unfaithful, verbally 
and physically abused her and her daughter, and refused to 
allow her to petition for immigration status.  The I.J. also found 
that her removal would result in extreme hardship. 
 
Da Silva appealed to the BIA, and the government filed 
for summary affirmance of the IJ’s decision.  In a 
nonprecedential opinion, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, 
agreeing that, although she had been subjected to extreme 
cruelty, the assault convictions were not “connected to” the 
cruelty.  The BIA reasoned that Leach did not “ask, encourage, 
compel, or coerce” her to commit the assault and that she “did 
not commit the assault on behalf of or for her husband.”12  Da 
Silva timely appeals, arguing that she is eligible for 
cancellation of removal because her convictions are 
“connected to” the cruelty.  The government has filed a motion 
to remand to the BIA so that it may conduct a more thorough 
analysis of the term “connected to.”  In the alternative, the 
government asks that we deny the petition, arguing that the 
BIA properly interpreted and applied “connected to.”   
                                                 
10 A.R. 94.  
11 A.R. 94. 
12 A.R. 4.  
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II 
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  Where, 
as here, the BIA expressly adopts portions of the IJ’s decision, 
we review both the BIA and IJ decisions.13  We review findings 
of fact “under the deferential substantial evidence standard,”14 
and we review legal conclusions de novo, subject to 
established rules of deference.15  The BIA’s decision is not 
entitled to Chevron deference because it is nonprecedential.16    
 
III 
 Our analysis proceeds in two parts.  First, we address 
the government’s motion to remand to the BIA and conclude 
that remand is not appropriate here.  Next, we apply our 
principles of statutory interpretation to the term “connected 
to.”  We hold that the term has a clear and unambiguous 
meaning and that the BIA’s construction of “connected to” was 
overly narrow and contrary to the plain language of the statute.  
 
A.  The Motion to Remand to the BIA is Denied. 
The government urges us to remand to the BIA so that 
it may re-interpret the term “connected to.”  The government 
does not concede that the BIA’s construction of the term was 
improper but rather argues that remand is warranted to permit 
                                                 
13 Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2004). 
14 Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483 (3d Cir. 2001). 
15 Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir. 2005). 
16 See Mahn v. Att’y Gen., 767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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the BIA an opportunity to fully consider the “ambiguous” 
phrase “connected to.”  We decline the government’s invitation 
to remand because the factors supporting remand are not 
present here.  Indeed, we conclude that the phrase “connected 
to” is unambiguous, leaving no statutory gaps for the BIA to 
fill. 
 
Remand is appropriate where an agency has yet to 
consider the issue presented to the court.  For instance, in I.N.S. 
v. Orlando Ventura, 17 the Supreme Court held that the Ninth 
Circuit “committed clear error” when it decided a question 
itself in the first instance rather than remanding to the BIA.18  
Remand is also called for where there has been a change in law 
or an intervening event.19  Neither factor is present in this case.  
                                                 
17 537 U.S. 12 (2002). 
18 Id. at 17; see also, Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 
(2006) (where the “matter requires determining the facts and 
deciding whether the facts as found fall within a statutory 
term,” the BIA, not a court of appeals, should make the initial 
determination); Okeke v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 585, 595 n.14 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (“We thus may not raise the issue [of whether the 
petitioner was convicted of a controlled substance offense] sua 
sponte and decide it de novo.  Rather, we must remand so that 
the BIA may have the first opportunity to address the issue.”). 
19 See, e.g., Leia v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 427, 438-39 (3d Cir. 
2005) (remanding for reconsideration in light of a released 
opinion that had not been available to either the IJ or BIA at 
the time of their respective decisions); SKF USA Inc. v. 
United States, 254 F.3d 1022, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he 
agency may seek a remand because of intervening events 
outside of the agency’s control, for example, a new legal 
decision or the passage of new legislation.”). 
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The BIA has already interpreted and applied the term 
“connected to,” and thus, we would not be conducting a de 
novo inquiry as in Ventura and its progeny.  Moreover, there 
has been no change in law or intervening event that would 
affect the BIA’s analysis.  The government asked the BIA to 
summarily affirm the IJ’s decision.  If it wanted the BIA to 
conduct a re-analysis of “connected to,” it should have asked 
the BIA to do so the first time around.20 
 
We might be more inclined to remand if the BIA’s 
subsequent, precedential interpretation of “connected to” 
would receive Chevron deference.21  But it would not.  
Under Chevron step one, we determine “if the statute is silent 
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue of law in the 
case.”22  If the statute is unambiguous, there are no statutory 
                                                 
20 We have denied requests to remand to the BIA under similar 
circumstances.  See Ildefonso-Candelario v. Att’y Gen., 866 
F.3d 102, 106-07 (3d Cir. 2017) (refusing request for a remand 
to the BIA because there was no “emerging case law” that 
justified “giving the BIA a second bite at the apple” when it 
committed error on the first try); Borrome v. Att’y Gen., 687 
F.3d 150, 156 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012) (rejecting a request for a 
remand to the BIA when the government asked for a summary 
affirmance but then changed its “tune” and gave “no good 
reason why the BIA should have a second chance to consider 
the issues” when, at the “[g]overnment’s insistence, [it] chose 
not to do so” the first time). 
21 See SKF USA Inc., 254 F.3d at 1029-30 (where courts defer 
to agency constructions of ambiguous statutes under Chevron 
“we believe a remand to the agency is required, absent the most 
unusual circumstances verging on bad faith”). 
22 Lin–Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 
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gaps for the agency to fill, and our inquiry ends.23  Only where 
the statute is ambiguous do we move to step two and determine 
if the agency’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable and 
thus entitled to deference.24   
 
As a threshold matter, we are not convinced that the 
Chevron framework applies here because interpreting 
“connected to” does not implicate the BIA’s “expertise in a 
meaningful way,”25  Rather it appears to be “a pure question of 
statutory construction for the courts to decide.”26  Even if the 
Chevron framework did apply, “connected to” is unambiguous 
as discussed below and therefore, the meaning of “connected 
to” is resolved under the first step of Chevron.   
                                                 
2009) (en banc) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
23 Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
24 Id.  
25 Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 1999).    
26 INS v. Cardoza–Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987).  The 
term “connected to” sounds in causality and does not implicate 
the BIA’s expertise in immigration law.  The courts are better 
positioned than the BIA to construe statutory language related 
to causation.  See Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 151 (3d Cir. 
2004) (declining to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of 
“aggravated felon” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) because the 
“interpretation and exposition of criminal law is a task outside 
the BIA’s sphere of special competence”); Sandoval, 166 F.3d 
at 239 (explaining that the BIA’s decision as to the effective 
date of a statute does not receive Chevron deference because 
the issue “is not one that implicates agency expertise in a 
meaningful way”).   
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Accordingly, we will deny the government’s motion to 
remand to the BIA to re-interpret “connected to.” 
 
B. “Connected to” is Unambiguous, and the BIA’s 
Construction of the Term is at Odds With its 
Unambiguous Meaning. 
 
 We employ well-established principles of statutory 
interpretation to determine the meaning of “connected to,” first 
asking whether the term has a plain and unambiguous 
meaning.27  If the statutory language is unambiguous, our 
inquiry ends because courts must presume that Congress “says 
in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says 
there.”28  In determining whether language is unambiguous, we 
“read the statute in its ordinary and natural sense.”29  
 
To ascertain the ordinary meaning of words, “[w]e refer 
to standard reference works such as legal and general 
dictionaries.”30  Dictionaries define the word “connected” 
similarly.  Miriam-Webster defines it as “having the parts or 
elements logically linked together;”31 the Oxford English 
                                                 
27 Dobrek v. Phelan, 419 F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2005). 
28 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 
2010) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 
253-54 (1992)).  
29 Harvard Secured Creditors Liquidation Trust v. I.R.S., 568 
F.3d 444, 451 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).  
30 United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(using dictionary definitions of “persecution” to hold that the 
term is unambiguous).  
31 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam- 
webster.com/dictionary/connected (last visited July 26, 2019). 
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Dictionary defines it as “related, associated (in idea or 
nature);”32 and Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as “to 
associate as in occurrence or in idea.”33  Together, these 
definitions indicate that the term “connected to” means 
“having a causal or logical relationship.”34   
 
The government argues that the plain meaning of 
“connected to” is too broad to be unambiguous; however, “a 
term in a statute is not ambiguous merely because it is broad in 
scope.”35  Application of the plain, expansive meaning of 
“connected to” is called for as long as it is supported by the 
“broader context of the statute as a whole,”36 and, indeed, the 
statutory context does support such application.  Two other 
VAWA-based provisions in the INA are instructive because 
Congress expressly limited the broad scope of “connection” in 
                                                 
32 Oxford English Online Dictionary, 
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39329?rskey=nSSxs9&resu
lt=2&isAdvanced=false#eid (last visited July 26, 2019). 
33 Black’s Law Dictionary 302 (6th ed. 1990).   
34  We came to a similar conclusion in United States v. Loney.  
In that case, we held that the phrase “in connection with” had 
a plain and ordinary meaning and “expresse[d] some 
relationship or association, one that can be satisfied in a 
number of ways such as a causal or logical relation or other 
type of relationship.”  219 F.3d 281, 283-84 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(emphasis added).  
35 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d at 310; see 
also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) 
(“Broad general language is not necessarily ambiguous when 
congressional objectives require broad terms.”).  
36 Contreras Aybar v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 916 
F.3d 270, 273 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 13 
 
those provisions.  Under the first statute, battered spouses are 
exempt from a certain ground of inadmissibility if they can 
show, inter alia, that “there was a substantial connection 
between the battery or cruelty . . . and the alien’s unlawful entry 
into the United States.”37  A second statute, which applies to 
VAWA self-petitioners who are divorced from their abusive 
spouses, requires petitioners to demonstrate “a connection 
between the legal termination of the marriage within the past 2 
years and battering or extreme cruelty.”38  Both of these 
provisions reveal that Congress knew how to narrow the 
otherwise expansive term “connection”—either by  including 
a modifier like “substantial” or a temporal requirement—but 
chose not to for VAWA cancellation of removal.   
 
The government also cites the interpretive principle that 
statutory exceptions should be read narrowly so as not to 
“swallow” the general rule.39  Retaining the plain meaning of 
“connected to” in the exception to the good moral character 
requirement does not swallow the cancellation of removal 
statute; rather, it aligns with its purpose.  VAWA cancellation 
of removal is “intended to ameliorate the impact of harsh 
provisions of immigration law on abused women.”40  A narrow 
                                                 
37 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(ii)(III) (emphasis added).  
38 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)(CC)(ccc) (emphasis 
added). 
39 See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 
471, 487, 504 n.2 (1999); see also Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 
726, 739 (1989) (“[When] a general statement of policy is 
qualified by an exception, we usually read the exception 
narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the 
provision.”).  
40 Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 840 (9th Cir. 2003) (in 
 14 
 
construction, like the one the BIA adopted here, would 
frustrate this statute’s larger goal by limiting the exception to 
those who committed crimes at the direction of their abuser.  
There are other reasons for which an abused spouse might 
commit acts that, absent the abuse, would indicate bad 
character.  We do not need to develop that list in connection 
with this case, but at the same time we should not limit the 
applicability of the exception in a way that is contrary to the 
intent of the statute.      
    
As the government notes, there are Supreme Court cases 
stating that the phrase “in connection with” is so broad that it 
is indeterminate; however, these cases do not compel the same 
holding here.  In those cases, the application of “in connection 
with” conflicted with the purpose of the statutes at issue.  For 
instance, in Maracich v. Spears,41 the Court addressed a statute 
that prohibited the Departments of Motor Vehicles from 
disclosing personal information except, inter alia, where the 
information is used “in connection with” judicial and 
administrative proceedings.42  The Court held that because the 
plain meaning of “in connection with” is so broad, a plain 
meaning interpretation would undercut the purpose of the 
statute—namely protecting privacy rights.43  Similarly, in New 
                                                 
the context of interpreting “extreme cruelty”).    
41 570 U.S. 48 (2013). 
42 Id. at 52. 
43 Id. at 59 (“[In connection with], in literal terms, could be 
interpreted to its broadest reach to include the personal 
information that respondents obtained here.  But if no limits 
are placed on the text of the exception, then all uses of personal 
information with a remote relation to litigation would be 
exempt under [this provision].”). 
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York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Insurance Co.,44 the Court held that applying the 
plain and ordinary meaning of “in connection with” or “related 
to” would not comport with the objectives of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act.45  Da Silva’s case is 
distinguishable because, as discussed, a plain meaning 
application of “connected to” furthers, not undercuts, the 
objectives of the VAWA cancellation statute. 
 
Lastly, the government cites a U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services interoffice memorandum that addresses 
the meaning of “connected to.”  This memo does not affect our 
analysis.  The memo first defines “connected to” as 
compulsion or coercion, but then conflates “connected to” with 
but-for causation.46  As an initial matter, this memo’s 
                                                 
44 514 U.S. 645 (1995). 
45 Id. at 656 (“We simply must go beyond the unhelpful text 
and the frustrating difficulty of defining its key term, and look 
instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the 
scope of the state law that Congress understood would 
survive.”); see also Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1990 
(2015) (narrowing the plain meaning of “related to” in an 
immigration statute because a “sweeping interpretation departs 
so sharply from the statute’s text and history that it cannot be 
considered a permissible reading”).  
46 Specifically, the memo says that in order for an act or 
conviction to be considered sufficiently connected to the 
battering or extreme cruelty, “the evidence must establish that 
the battering or extreme cruelty experienced by the self-
petitioner compelled or coerced him/her to commit the act or 
crime for which he/she was convicted.  In other words, the 
evidence should establish that the self-petitioner would not 
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interpretation is not binding on this Court or the BIA, and it is 
entitled to respect only to the extent it has the power to 
persuade.47  It is not persuasive.  Its interpretation is at odds 
with the plain meaning of “connected to” to the extent that it 
requires compulsion and coercion rather than a causal or 
logical relationship.  It is also internally inconsistent because 
compulsion/coercion and but-for causation are very different 
standards.   
 
Thus, we hold that “connected to” is unambiguous and 
means “having a causal or logical relationship.”  Applying the 
plain meaning of “connected to” to this case, Da Silva has 
established that her convictions are connected to the extreme 
cruelty she suffered.  The IJ and the BIA held that Leach’s 
adultery was part of the extreme cruelty, and Da Silva assaulted 
L.N. while confronting Leach and L.N. about the affair.  This 
meets the causal or logical relationship standard.  
 
IV 
                                                 
have committed the act or crime in the absence of the battering 
or extreme cruelty.”  USCIS Interoffice Memorandum, 
Determinations of Good Moral Character in VAWA-Based 
Self-Petitions, Yates to Novak, Jan. 19, 2005, 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memor
anda/Static_Files_Memoranda/Archives%201998-
2008/2005/gmc_011905.pdf (emphasis added).    
47 Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) 
(“[I]nterpretations contained in formats such as opinion letters 
are ‘entitled to respect’ under our decision in Skidmore v. Swift 
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), but only to the extent that 
those interpretations have the ‘power to persuade.’”). 
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 For these reasons, we will deny the government’s 
motion to remand to the BIA to reconsider the term “connected 
to,” grant the petition for review, vacate the BIA’s order of 
removal, and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.  
